Industry specificity is important to affect board diversity-performance relationship. Prior studies are flawed by assuming that Malaysian industries are homogenous, and industry peculiarities might not be captured by the aggregate results of all firms in the country. The ability of board diversity to boost firms' performance could be affected by a specific nature of the industries. The purpose of this study is to examine the combined effect of board diversity on firm performance. We also examined the moderating role of industry specificity on the board diversity-performance relationship. Data were collected from 180 listed firms in Malaysia for the period of 2012 to 2016 to avoid the implication of the Companies Act 1965 revamp in late 2016 and the latest MCCG reform in 2017. Data were analysed using the random effect panel data regression to test the research hypotheses. The findings suggest that firm performance is influenced by the combined effects of board diversity dimensions. The findings confirmed the importance of industry effect indicated by the variations of board diversity-performance relationship across industries. Other significant factors include firm's growth, size, and leverage. Thus, different industries in Malaysia should utilize a distinguished corporate governance framework to improve firm performance according to their industry specificities.
ownership (Coles, Daniel, & Naveen, 2008) . Large boards are argued to bring more excellent monitoring and advice (Shukeri et al., 2012) , expertise (Zahra & Pearce, 1989) , experience (Dalton, 2005) , social networks, and external resources, and less probability of dominant BoD (Dalton, Daily, Johnson, & Ellstrand, 1999; Goodstein, Gautam, & Boeker, 1994 ) that in turn, improves the financial performance of the firm (Wang et al., 2017) . Instead, a small board is favorable because of the effectiveness of working in a small group. Yermack (1996) contended that large group not only decrease the speed of decisions but also increase the tendency of having free riding and social loafing problems. Individual BoD tends to put less effort, knowing the others have undertaken the responsibilities (Dalton et al., 1999) . Other issues associated with large boards include increase communication problems, difficulties to control the boards and to monitor the managers (Jensen, 1993; O'Connell & Cramer, 2010; Yermack, 1996) , which could develop conflicts.
Board independence is one of CG mechanisms to reduce agency problems and managerial decision. Fama and Jensen (1983) believed that outsiders are less beholden to management and thus avoid conflict of interest while maximizing shareholders value. External directors, although they have fewer skills to tackle the management in providing advice, they have high independence to exercising control. Besides, independent board could have more information and expertise in certain areas, thus offering greater coordination and judgements (Heravia, Saat, Karbhari, & Nassir, 2011 , Shukeri et al., 2012 . They also help the company to get access to external resources and networks like potential stakeholders along the supply chain including the authorities and social groups (Heravia et al., 2011) , which enhance the business development process and prospects in the long run. In contrast, several studies found that board independence is not significant to add value to the firm due to inadequate monitoring execution and corporate cultural barrier (Agrawal & Knoeber, 1996; Yermack, 1996; Arosa, Iturralde, & Maseda, 2013) . Other studies asserted that the presence of dominant internal directors in influencing decision-making process could be the reason for the ineffective function of external BoD to increase firm performance (Abdul Rahman & Mohamed Ali, 2006) . Adams and Ferreira (2009) emphasized that managerial ownership may result in both positive and negative outcomes depending on the shareholders' rights, as too much monitoring can be counterproductive. High ownership may also consequence in an entrenched board which prefer self-interest over stakeholders' interest that in turn, takes a different direction (Jesen & Meckling, 1976) . Consequently, the separation of ownership from control could be a better option. In contrast, Carter et al. (2010) suggested that board ownership results in a more Journal of Nusantara Studies 2019, Vol 4(2) involved board, better monitoring and high corporate performance since they could alleviate agency conflicts between managers and owners (Jensen & Meckling, 1976) . Some studies based their argument on the implication of moral hazards such as managers pursuing their interest at the expense of shareholder's interest (Agrawal & Knoeber, 1996) and information asymmetry (Ezzamel & Watson, 1993) . However, there are also empirical findings revealing that directors' shareholding does not affect firm performance (Chiang, 2005; Shukeri et al., 2012) .
CEO duality exists when the BoD holds a CEO and a chairman position. The stewardship theory proposes that CEO duality will act as a responsible guardian of the company and encourages 'pro-organizational behavior' (Boyd, 1995; Dalton, Daily, Ellstrand, & Johnson, 1998; Finkelstein & D'Aveni, 1994; Peng, Zhang, & Li, 2007; Sridharan & Marsinko, 1997) . It also promotes strong leadership and confidence that would facilitate quick decisions and hence improve corporate value. Tin and Shu (2008) suggested that the practice of CEO duality is more effective for the case of a non-family firm since it reduces the monitoring costs on CEO-chairperson. From the psychological viewpoint, CEO duality contributes to a better achievement because he/she who possess sound knowledge, skills and abilities will offer their best commitment to retain the job (Goh & Lee, 2016) . Nevertheless, some studies contend that CEO duality causes an ineffective monitoring system due to developed conflicts (e.g. Bliss et al., 2007; Daynton, 1984; Millstein, 1992) . Other studies found that firm performance and CEO duality has no significant relationship (Abdullah, 2014; Dalton et al., 1998; Ujunwa, 2012) . While many studies have examined the direct effect of each board diversity dimensions on firm performance, empirical studies are scarce on the interest of examining the impact of combining multiple dimensions of diversity into single-board diversity score. The early research by Siciliano (1996) 
Board Diversity, Industry Specificity and Firm Performance
Early research on industrial organization and strategic management suggest that the industry structure is the primary driver in determining the variations in firm performance (Porter, 1980) . The market concentration for firms in a high competition industry is likely to be profitable (Porter, 1980 (Porter, , 1996 . The industry specificities influence a firm's decisions, which results in different industry-specific-performance between firms (Mason, 1939) . The theoretical basis of industry-performance relationship derives from the Structure-Conduct-Performance (SCP) framework, which proposes the significant association between market structure and profitability. Thompson (1967) added that industry conditions vary by the level of challenges and uncertainties, which affect managerial decisions and firm strategies differently. In support of this theory, Narayan and Sharma (2011) and Amin and Janor (2016) argued that industries are heterogeneous due to different market structure. Therefore, the generalization of the market performance results, without incorporating the industry effect, will lead to incorrect estimations.
However, empirical research on board diversity-industry-performance is particularly limited. Few studies found variations in board diversity practice depending on industry and company size among Scandinavian countries and for publicly traded Fortune 1000 firms (Carter et al., 2003) . Some studies argued that the level of board diversity varies across industries. For example, female directors are more prevalent in service industries like technology and healthcare industries (Harrigan, 1981) . Whereas according to Kang et al. (2007) , finance industries prefer male and experienced board members. The study also found that BoD independence and age diversity are significantly associated with industry effect but not gender diversity. Likewise, Ravina and Sapienza (2009) showed that board independence not only influenced by their inner-interest but also conditioned by industry requirements. Benson et al. (2011) documented that board governance is more effective in the consumer product industry than in industrial product industry. Recently, Uribe-Bohorquez et al. (2018) found that the effect of board independence on firm performance is greater in industries with a robust legal system. These arguments build the basis for the implication of how the industry specificity will modify the role of board diversity on firm performance. Therefore, we developed the following hypotheses:
H1: Board diversity does not affect firm performance Journal of Nusantara Studies 2019, Vol 4(2) Rejection of Hypothesis 1 implies that board diversity affects firm performance. If the null Hypothesis 1 is rejected, the estimated β1 is significant, and the sign of the coefficient could be either positive or negative. If it is positive, it suggests that firm performance is improved by the presence of diversity in board composition in terms of gender, ethnicity, managerial ownership, the board size, board independence, and CEO duality. In contrast, if it is negative, it implies that having board diversity reduces firm performance. Failure to reject the null hypothesis suggests that board diversity does not add value to the firm.
In the case of Hypothesis 2, the rejection of the null indicates that the effect industry specificity moderates the impact of board diversity on firm performance. In particular, if the sign of β3 is significantly positive, it shows that the marginal effect of board diversity on the performance of firms in Industryi is higher compared to other industries, whereas if it is significantly negative, it suggests that the marginal effect of board diversity on performance of Industryi is lower compared to other industries. In other words, if the null H2 is rejected, it implies that the degree impact of board diversity on firm performance is different across industries. Failure to reject the null H2 highlight that the impact of board diversity on firm performance is the same for each industry in the country.
METHODOLOGY
The dataset comprises of 180 listed firms on Bursa Malaysia involving six industries (Consumer, Manufacturing, Technology, Property, Plantation and Trading/ Services). These industries have been the primary industries driving Malaysia economies. The secondary data are retrieved from the published annual report from 2012 to 2016. We select the period of the study to avoid the implication of the Companies Act 1965 revamp in late 2016 and the latest MCCG reform in 2017. We employ equally 30 companies from each industry in arbitrary for the five years of observations subject to the data availability, owing to 900 firm-year observations in total.
Journal of Nusantara Studies 2019, Vol 4(2) (Gujarati, 2004) . BD*Dindustry is interactive dummy between board diversity and observed-industries. We interact the board diversity with industry to identify whether the impact of board diversity on firm performance is the same for industry 1, 2 and 3. Control indicates the generic firm-specific variables including growth, size, leverage and age. α is constant, β is the coefficient of variation, while ε refer to random disturbance. i and t are firm and time, respectively.
Based on previous studies, this study includes control variables that could affect firm performance, such as the firm's growth, size, age, and also leverage. Firm size is measured by logarithm of total assets with the anticipation that firm size has a positive relation to firm performance as the larger firm has a competitive advantage because of economies of scales, market power, growth and profitability (Punnose, 2008; Alarussi & Alhaderi, 2018) . Growth measures earning growth of the firm, which indicates the good prospects in the future (Al-Akra & Ali, 2012: Abdullah, Abdul Shukor, Mohamed, & Ahmad, 2015); thus positive relationship with firm performance is expected. Firm age is the years since the establishment of a firm until 2016. A young firm is less than 50 years, while the old firm is greater than 50 years (Anderson & Reeb, 2003) . It is expected that the younger firm has smaller profit since they have higher capital cost and less experience in the market (Coad, Segarra, & Teruel, 2013) . Leverage or debt to the firms' assets has a positive association toward good corporate governance to enhance firms' good reputation (Cho & Kim, 2003; Black, Jang, & Kim, 2006 other studies (Bokhari & Khan, 2013; Saeed, Gull, & Rasheed, 2013) argued that high leverage lowers the firm performance due to limited investment opportunities. Table 2 provides a descriptive analysis of all variables for each industry. It shows that Industry 1 (manufacturing and consumer) has outperformed the industry-average profitability both in terms of ROA (0.06) and ROE (0.08). Board composition for Industry 2 (plantation and property) is the most diverse (0.60), followed by Industry 3 (technology and trading/ services) (0.5). In terms of firm growth, all industries experienced negative growth during the years, especially Industry 1 (−1.21). Size of the firms in Industry 3 is the biggest (21.0) among the three, while Industry 2 has the most established firms (in term of age) (38.6). By referring to capital structure, Industry 3 is highly leveraged compared to the others (0.4). Table 3 shows the correlation analysis between the variables tested in the model. All variables are correlated below than 0.5, except the alternative performance measure, which is ROA and ROE with 0.83. Since the correlation coefficients are small and below the threshold of 0.9 (Tabachnick & Fidel, 2007; Shukeri et al., 2012) , the problem of multicollinearity is not present in the regression model. Table 4 reports the random effect panel data regression analysis of the relationship between board diversity and firm performance, controlling for several firm-specific factors.
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Based on the ROA as the firm performance measure, it shows that board diversity has a significant negative impact on firm performance. A 1% increase in diversity decrease by 15.7% of firm ROA. It implies that the combined effects of different dimensions of board diversity affect the board's decision-making, but reduce firm value. Contradict to the argument put forth by the proponent of board diversity that diversity can better represent the societies and improve decision-making due to creativity and experiences; our findings seem to differ. The negative relationship suggests that diversity may lead to increased complexity in decision-making and time-consuming due to slower action and response, which consequence an overall lower firm performance (Campbell & Mínguez-Vera, 2008) . Board diversity may not improve firm value due to weak monitoring roles and cultural barriers, especially in the case of participation of outsiders (Agrawal & Knoeber, 1996; Yermack, 1996; Arosa et al., 2013) . Moreover, diverse board members may lead to less effective governance due to rising conflict of interest and agency cost and ineffective monitoring system (Bliss et al., 2007; Daynton, 1984; Millstein, 1992) . Other problems associated with diversity include increase communication barrier and obstacles to coordinate the directors and thereby poor supervising of top management performance (Jensen, 1993; O'Connell & Cramer, 2010; Yermack, 1996) . It is not surprising; therefore, certain companies prefer less diversity of board members, probably due to better control and quick decisions to arrive at a consensus. The significant positive coefficient of interactive dummy between board diversity and industry for both industries hint two important notes. First, the impact of board diversity is not the same across the three industries. Second, the positive coefficient indicates that the marginal effect of board diversity is 0.18% higher for Industry 1 and 0.17% higher for industry 2, respectively, compared to other industries. Interestingly, we also found that the firm performance of each industry can be differentiated as Industry 1 has significantly 0.06% lower ROA while Industry 2 has significantly 0.09% lower than the average industries. The findings contradict significantly to the earlier descriptive analysis after accounting for the effect of board diversity and other controlling factors. 
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